



Hiram Bingham, an American vice-consul in Marseille, France, who participated in the rescue of many artists and writers, took this photograph from his office window of refugees waiting in line outside the consulate, ca. 1940-1941. *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of Hiram Bingham*

American Immigration Policies from World War I through World War II

Rebecca Erbelding

Under the headline “America of the Melting Pot Comes to an End,” Senator David Reed (R-PA), writing in *The New York Times* on April 27, 1924, explained that “Until now, we have proceeded upon the theory that America was ‘the refuge of the oppressed of all nations.’”¹ The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, which he cosponsored with Representative Albert Johnson (R-OR), “marks a new departure in the American attitude on this subject.” Any reader who made it past the first few sentences and scanned beyond the two large maps that spread out just below the headline—the ones that demonstrated how immigration was to be restricted from now on—would have read some of the caveats to Reed’s claim that the United States had long been a haven for the oppressed. United States immigration law had already established “certain physical and moral standards which . . . operated only to exclude the cases of gross unfitness.” That “gross unfitness,” by 1917, included, among a long list, people with epilepsy, people with

mental illness, members of what we would now call the LGBTQ community, and anyone “unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge,” a clause used to bar blind people, those with hereditary deafness, and a long list of exclusionary “disabilities” down to flat feet.²

The country already forbade the immigration of Chinese people (1882); the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907 kept Japanese immigrants out; and court cases pended over whether specific naturalized citizens were too brown to really be American citizens, as the Naturalization Act of 1790 limited naturalization to “free white persons of good character.” (The 1870 amendment to that Act nominally extended naturalization to people of African descent, but Black Americans were bureaucratically denied many of the rights of citizenship for more than a century.) At the time Reed wrote his editorial, indigenous people born in the territorial boundaries of land claimed by the United States had not yet been granted American citizenship. “Unfortunate circumstances, that need not be elaborated here,” Reed wrote, made it necessary to continue to exclude “all aliens ineligible for citizenship,” a provision now extended “impartially” to “all Chinese, East Indians, Afghans, Burmese, Siamese, Japanese, and other Asiatic and Malay peoples.” His new law would pass by overwhelming bipartisan support, be signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge, restrict the number of immigrants fleeing Nazi persecution permitted to enter the United States, and remain the law of the land, largely unchanged, for more than forty years.

The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, also known as the National Origins Act, placed the responsibility for granting entry into the United States with American consular officers abroad, rather than with immigration personnel at the border. Ellis Island, the gateway to the United States for the millions of immigrants who had presented minimal documentation for entry in previous decades, instead effectively became a holding pen for those who did not pass the cursory examination on arrival. After 1924, United States immigration visas were granted by State Department officials at a small number of consulates in countries across the sea. There was a set number of visas—2 percent of the “national origins”³ of American citizens as counted in the 1890 census—available to each country. By tying the quota to the 1890 census, immigration restrictionists effectively sought to nullify the impact of the millions of new Jewish and Catholic immigrants from southern and eastern Europe upon the “national origins” of the United States.

By 1929, Congress had placed an overall cap on immigration to the United States at 153,879 quota immigrants each year.⁴ The quotas for countries in northern and western Europe were the highest, representing 82 percent (127,266) of all available visas. Countries in southern and eastern Europe received smaller caps: 386 for Lithuania; 2,712 for the Soviet Union; 5,802 for Italy. In an effort to prevent immigration waves, State Department officials were permitted to authorize only 10 percent of a country’s quota visas each month, resulting in, for instance, fewer than forty visas per month available to immigrants born in Lithuania. As the law was based in the pseudoscience of eugenics, which posited that “races” and ethnicities had immutable, inheritable characteristics, potential immigrants had to apply for the quota of their country of birth (“national origin”) rather than that of their country of residence, although they could go through the examination process at the closest visa-granting American consulate to their home.

There were a few ways to game the quota system. Preference was granted to the unmarried children (under age 21), parents and spouses of American citizens over the age of 21, and to skilled agricultural workers and their families. If these applicants could successfully demonstrate their qualifications for immigration, they could effectively jump to the front of any visa waiting list. However, no more than 50 percent of the yearly quota could be spent on preference applicants.

Some potential immigrants could also qualify for a nonquota visa. These were reserved for individuals from the Western Hemisphere, the wives and unmarried minor children (under 18) of US citizens; foreign students attending school in the United States; professors or teachers who had job contracts in the United States and their families; and religious leaders joining congregations along with their families.⁵ While nonquota immigrants still needed entry and immigration visas, these visas were not numerically limited and were not counted against the quota.

While the term “refugee” was often used to describe potential immigrants seeking to flee religious or racial persecution and violence, United States law did not include separate provisions for refugees or asylum seekers. Only immigrants and nonimmigrants existed in United States law, and all had to follow the same slow, deliberate, bureaucratic progress. The Immigration Act of 1917 exempted applicants fleeing religious or political persecution from the otherwise mandatory literacy test; the State Department interpreted this exemption in the law as implicit confirmation that all other paperwork and regulations still applied to those applicants.

No matter if an immigrant was applying for a preference or nonpreference quota visa or a nonquota visa, all applicants had to submit extensive paperwork: an application with information on family members and places of residence for the previous five years; two copies of their birth certificate, military records, and a police certificate confirming the potential immigrant was not a criminal. Potential immigrants had to submit photographs, get a clean bill of health from a doctor approved by the consular officials, and have a personal interview with a consular officer. If the applicant was successful, the consular officer would issue a visa valid for four months. Per the law, there was a \$10.00 application fee (\$1.00 for the application, \$9.00 for the actual visa), equivalent to about \$150 in 2021.⁶

Throughout the 1920s, quotas were usually filled or near capacity. But in October 1929, the Wall Street crash and ensuing economic depression led to concerns that new immigrants would take jobs needed by American citizens. On September 15, 1930, consular officials were instructed to consider more carefully whether prospective applicants were likely to become a public charge at any point in the future, since it could not be assumed that new immigrants would easily find wage-earning jobs. This was not a new law, or even an Executive Order; the White House simply instructed the State Department to strictly enforce a provision of the Immigration Act of 1917. In a 1933 report, the State Department calculated that for quota years 1927–1930, it had issued 887,386 immigration visas. For 1931–1933, it had issued 157,775, a net decrease of 719,611 visas. Over 86,000 people were rejected as potential public charges during that period.⁷

In January 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor in Germany. US diplomats there quickly began to send reports detailing the Nazis' abusive and discriminatory treatment of Jews with details about Jews being molested on the streets, fired from public sector jobs, and kicked out of public schools, and about the boycotting of Jewish-owned businesses. Consul General George Messersmith reported from Berlin: "It is quite clear that steps are being taken every day which will make the life of the Jew in Germany practically intolerable in the future. . . . I personally see no hope for the Jews in Germany for years to come and all those who can get out of the country, will wish to do so."⁸ But he also noted that many Jews desiring to leave Germany focused on western Europe rather than the United States:

"The number asking for visas for the United States is comparatively small. This is due to the fact that the difficulty in securing visas for the United States are [*sic*] well known and the Jews without resources are obliged to remain in the country. Those who are well off prefer to go to Holland, Switzerland and neighboring countries to await developments and not to be too far away from the property and the business which they are leaving behind in Germany."⁹

One example would be Otto Frank, father of future diarist Anne, who moved his family to the Netherlands in 1933 and set up a business there. While he actively began to gather papers for immigration to the United States in 1941, his efforts coincided with a crush of others in similar circumstances.


State Department officials soon concluded that the mistreatment of German Jews was not within their purview. A report of the Assistant Secretary in May 1933 stated:

"While in general it is recognized that strong anti-Jewish feeling exists in Germany and considerable persecution has occurred, there is nothing which the United States can do to alleviate the situation (1) because that which is happening is an internal matter of the German government; and (2) even if the United States were to make representations to Germany on the ground of humanity, it is more likely that instead of causing a more considerate treatment of the Jews, it would probably have the opposite effect and incite further activity against them."¹⁰

At the same time, the State Department and White House received hundreds of petitions, representing tens of thousands of Americans, calling on the United States government to condemn the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Few of these petitions, however, called for opening immigration. Throughout the 1930s, the letters pleading for a loosening of immigration laws were countered by others demanding that no changes be made or that more restrictions be put in place, sentiments that were echoed in public opinion polls at the time. To all correspondents the State Department replied that officials were complying with existing law and would continue to do so.

On November 18, 1933, Anneliese (Anni) Albers sailed for the United States from Bremen, Germany, on the *Europa*. She and her husband Josef, who was listed as "artist" (to Anni's "housewife"), held quota immigration visas, which they had obtained from the US consulate in Berlin in late October.¹¹ Although they might have qualified for nonquota visas as professors—they listed their intended destination as Black Mountain College, a recently opened

college in North Carolina—Josef and Anni Albers were two of the only 4,052 quota immigrants born in Germany granted visas in quota year 1934. That year, State Department officials could legally have issued 21,905 more visas under the German quota than they did.



An example of a waiting list document. This document shows that as of January 1939, Selmar and Elsa Biener were 45,685 and 45,686th in line for the German waiting list at the Berlin consulate. Each consulate kept its own list; by early 1939, there were approximately 240,000 people born in Germany on the waiting list for the United States. *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, gift of Diana Barzilay and Evelyn Hill*

Over the 1930s, immigration to the United States from Germany slowly increased, and State Department officials anecdotally reported that most of the applicants were Jewish Germans seeking to leave their country. These officials also recognized the public charge clause as a factor which could inhibit visa applications, particularly as Nazi Germany increasingly attempted to strip the wealth of all Jewish would-be emigrants. However, they determined early on that “[T]here is no relaxation in favor of Jews in Germany that can be made consistently with the law.”¹² In 1934, Nazi Germany permitted German Jews to emigrate with a maximum of 10,000 Reichsmarks in cash, equivalent to approximately \$3,832.00 USD (at that time).¹³ In January 1937, the State Department liberalized the interpretation of the public charge clause, instructing consular officers only to deny applicants who were “liable” to become a public charge, not all who could possibly ever become one.¹⁴ Still, any applicant who was not extraordinarily wealthy—and whose assets were able to avoid Nazi seizure—needed an American financial sponsor. That sponsor also needed to produce extensive paperwork, including multiple years of tax filings, bank statements, insurance statements, and letters of recommendation. Those applicants who did not have close family in the United States with the

means to provide sponsorship often attempted to contact total strangers who shared their last name, hoping to make a connection and find a sponsor. By 1939, a Jewish emigrant from Germany was only allowed to carry 10 RM, or \$4.00 USD.

On March 12, 1938, German troops entered Austria and within days, Austria was annexed into the German Reich. Roosevelt decided to invoke a provision in immigration statutes that allowed quotas in territories that ceased to exist to be subsumed into the territory into which they had been absorbed and merged the Austrian and German quotas. The new quota for German-born immigrants was 27,370. It was the second highest quota of any country in the world (to Great Britain), but the demand for visas under the German quota skyrocketed, with more than 200,000 more immigrants joining the waiting list over the next year. By June 1939, more than 300,000 people born in Germany, a majority of them Jewish, were on the waiting list for US immigration visas. Between June 1938 and July 1940, the State Department issued almost every visa legally available under the German quota, leaving just fifteen unused (which, as calculations were done by cable, could have been a clerical error.)¹⁵


Artist Friedel Dzubas (listed on the ship manifest as “Dzubasz, Friedebald”) trained as a farmer in an attempt to aid in his immigration, since the United States allowed agricultural immigrants to jump to the front of the line. The State Department ultimately declared that he was not really a farmer, but as he had already been on the immigration waiting list for over a year, Dzubas received a nonpreference-quota visa in August 1939. He sailed from Liverpool on the *Duchess of Richmond* on October 6, 1939.¹⁶ After arriving in New York, he joined friends at Hyde Farmlands, an estate in Burkeville, Virginia, set up to receive young German Jewish students who had trained in agriculture—in part so that they too could receive preference on the quota waiting list. Dzubas’s young wife, Dorothea, joined him in December. Hyde Farmlands never turned a profit and closed in 1941, but at least thirty Jewish teenagers were able to escape Germany as “farmers.”

The *Kristallnacht* pogroms of November 9–10, 1938, brought new urgency for Jews desperate to get out. For many men, arrested and sent to concentration camps, only proof that they would be immediately departing the country could bring them release. Families who had held back from applying now sought assistance from far-distant relations and even total strangers. American popular opinion, however, still opposed accepting more new arrivals. Ninety-four percent of Americans polled in late November 1938 sympathized with the plight of German Jews, but when asked “Should we allow a larger number of Jewish exiles from Germany to come to the United States to live?” 72 percent responded “no.”¹⁷

At this time, Fritz Ascher, a forty-five-year-old artist in Berlin, was prisoner 11365 at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Although he had been born into a Jewish family, Fritz and his younger sisters had converted and been baptized as Protestants before Fritz turned ten. Still, the September 1935 Reich Citizenship Law (one of the laws that became collectively known as the Nuremberg Laws) defined who was and who was not Jewish in Germany. The Aschers were declared to be Jewish, and so, as synagogues lay smoldering throughout the Reich in the wake of *Kristallnacht*, he and 30,000 other Jewish men were arrested and sent to concentration camps. Ascher was released in late December 1938 with the promise of escape to Shanghai, one of the only international destinations that did not require an entrance visa.

But he was arrested again in January and missed the ship that was to take him to the other side of the world. After his release five long months later, Ascher spent the next several years in Berlin unable to stage exhibitions, ill, and under police surveillance. From June 1942 until the Allied Armies came in April 1945, he remained in hiding with friends, never leaving his hiding place for nearly three years, even as the bombs rained down over Berlin.

On September 1, 1939, German troops invaded Poland, leading Britain and France to declare war. Germany invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940, and France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in May. German Jews who had found refuge in those countries joined the expanding refugee crisis. With the advent of war and crackdowns by the German government on emigration, State Department officials added additional steps to the visa application process. Would-be immigrants now had to show that they had proof of permission to leave Germany, usually a document from the police or the tax office, as well as proof that the prospective immigrant had booked passage to the Western Hemisphere. American reporters, relief workers, businessmen, and others were being urged by diplomatic personnel to leave and competed for spaces with the refugees who had been able to secure visas.



An example of a US immigration visa. This visa was issued in Vienna, Germany, to Kurt Fisch, who immigrated to the United States in February 1939. He was one of the 27,370 people born in Germany who received US immigration visas between July 1938 and June 1939. *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, gift of Kurt and Judith Fish*

Rudolf and Else Willheim sailed from Rotterdam on the *Statendam* on November 24, 1939. It would be the ship's last passenger voyage to the United States; the *Statendam* was destroyed in port in Rotterdam during the Nazi bombing of the city in May 1940. The Willheims' daughter, Lily (now known as artist Lily Renee), who was eighteen years old, first went to

London. She was able to obtain her visa there—quota visa 17910 under the German quota—and sailed on the *Georgic* from Liverpool, arriving in New York on February 11, 1940.

Although the United States was still neutral, rumors spread that Germany and the Soviet Union were taking advantage of the masses of Jewish refugees to send spies abroad. Many Americans feared that the countries of western Europe fell so quickly under Nazi occupation due to internal subversion—a “fifth column” secretly acting against the state. The Consul General in Algeria felt that the threat offered by refugees suggested that their sponsors should be investigated, as well as the refugees themselves:

“It has long been recognised [*sic*], although only recently brought forcibly to the attention of the world, that ‘refugees’ are often dangerous. They clothe themselves in misery and appeal, the better to carry on their nefarious work. The fact that any given applicant claims to have been, or actually establishes that he has been persecuted, does not necessarily prove the bona fide of his case; the Cavalry of a ‘refugee’ may be only the route prescribed by his employers to obtain easy entry into another country.”¹⁸

A telegram from the US consulate in Basel said that reliable sources mentioned Jews were being offered cash and visa assistance in Switzerland and the Netherlands in exchange for spying against the United States.¹⁹ The FBI submitted to the State Department a seventy-five-page list of names of people whose citizenship had been formally revoked by Germany, out of concern that German agents would pose as “refugee immigrants using passports confiscated from the persons whose names appear on lists.”²⁰ Many of these had the names “Sara” or “Israel” as middle names, suggesting that they were Jewish and forced by German law to add these middle names.

As immigration became a question of national security rather than labor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was transferred from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice in June 1940.²¹ The FBI continued to check visa application information and the names of persons entering the United States for evidence of anti-American activities, either pro-Nazi or pro-Communist. At about the same time, the State Department cautioned consular officials to exercise particular care in screening applicants: “In view of the international situation, it is essential that all aliens seeking admission into the United States, including both immigrants and nonimmigrants be examined with the greatest care.”²²

Even while Americans were aware of the desperate situation in Europe, many were still unwilling to welcome refugees or immigrants to American shores. State Department correspondence files included letters from prominent American organizations and private individuals demanding that immigration be curtailed or even shut down entirely. Multiple bills were introduced in Congress to severely curtail—or end entirely—immigration to the United States. While State Department press releases were careful not to specify the origin of many refugees, one woman wrote in to say, “We do not need even one more German or Jew in *our* America.”²³

With masses of refugees cramming ports in Europe and consular staff seriously overextended, the State Department decided to make a change to the practice of the waiting list. In a press release of December 18, 1940, they explained a new procedure: If a visa became

available for an applicant on the waiting list who did not have all their documentation in order, that applicant would be passed over and the visa would be given to someone else on the list who had completed the process. This procedure, called “unblocking,” attempted to expedite the immigration process for eligible applicants, who could then continue on their journey. For many Jewish immigrants, this change came too late. While some travelers were able to cross the Atlantic by plane, the majority of passengers had to travel by ship. Due to submarine warfare in the Atlantic and the need to refit passenger ships into troop ships, many passenger lines stopped or reduced the number of vessels crossing the ocean, making it more difficult for refugees to find berths. By summer 1940, Lisbon was the only neutral port in continental Europe with ships still sailing semi-regularly to the United States.²⁴

Refugees who had made it to England, however, could still sail, although the trip across the Atlantic posed risks. Arthur Szyk, a well-known Polish Jewish artist, had previously visited the United States for art exhibitions. He left England, where he had been living, for Canada in July 1940, and obtained a visitor visa to the United States, crossing the Canadian border to attend an exhibition at Barbizon Plaza in New York City in October 1940. Szyk decided to remain in the United States and, since Polish Jews trapped in eastern Europe were no longer competing for American immigration slots, he was able to trade in his visitor visa for an immigration visa. He crossed the Canadian border by car to register in November 1941. (Under US law, immigration status could not be changed in the United States, so “visitors” who intended to become immigrants needed to leave the country for their consular appointments.)

Continuing fears of infiltration and espionage led to additional restrictions on visa applicants. On June 5, 1941, diplomats abroad were cautioned that visas would soon be denied to applicants with close relatives remaining in German-occupied countries. American officials were concerned that unfriendly governments would use family members as hostages or bargaining chips to coerce immigrants to commit acts of sabotage or espionage.²⁵ The accompanying press release of June 18 noted that Consuls could make exceptions after consultation with the State Department in Washington and specified that reports suggesting attempts to recruit refugees as foreign agents were the primary reason for the new restrictions.²⁶

On July 1, 1941, the same day that the new “relatives rule” went into effect, the State Department centralized all alien visa control in Washington. Applicants who were waiting for the new monthly visa allotment, set for release on July 1st, were devastated to learn that their applications—in many cases already approved by the local consulate—now had to be sent to Washington for further review. Internal State Department memos had been discussing the need for this measure for months, in response to reports of espionage from Moscow and Portugal, but it came as a shock to refugees and aid workers.²⁷ All applications for immigrant and nonimmigrant visas were placed before an interdepartmental review committee consisting of representatives of the Visa Division, Immigration and Naturalization Service, FBI, Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Navy Department’s Office of Naval Intelligence. At the same time, American consulates were closing all over Nazi-occupied Europe. In mid-June, in retaliation for American demands for the closure of German consulates in the United States—which were legitimate hotbeds of spies—Nazi Germany had ordered the United States to shut down its consulates in all German-occupied territories. Italy likewise demanded

American consulates close. The only hope for refugees in these areas was escape to a country where American officials could still issue visas. The new immigration restrictions, in addition to the forced closure of the consulates and the difficulty in escaping a continent at war, are evident in the 1942 statistics. Between July 1, 1941, and June 30, 1942, the United States only admitted 4,883 immigrants under the German quota.²⁸

Hedwig Stern, also known as Hedda Sterne, was among the refugees fighting to find a consulate and physically escape. Her husband, Friedrich, had managed to secure a US immigration visa in Romania, and was one of the rare immigrants who arrived in New York by plane. He boarded the *Yankee Clipper* in Lisbon in June 1940, and escaped Europe on the same flight as Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce. Hedda, on the other hand, was stuck in Europe for over a year, finally obtaining her visa under the Romanian quota (limited to 377 per year) in Lisbon on October 13, 1941. She sailed for the United States four days later on the *Excambion*, likely with the assistance of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, which tried to purchase all the available ship tickets to the United States as soon as they became available, to reserve them for Jewish immigrants fleeing Europe. Although there was never a “last ship” sailing from Europe—Lisbon remained open for passenger departures throughout the war—Hedda was fortunate. In late October 1941, Nazi Germany made Jewish emigration illegal from all the countries it occupied. Forced migration was no longer Nazi policy; the regime had turned to genocide.

Historian Peter Hayes has estimated that in July 1941, two-thirds of the Jews who would be murdered in the Holocaust—four million people—were still alive. By March 1943, just nineteen months later, those four million were gone.²⁹ The Chelmno killing center, the first static killing center utilizing poison gas for mass murder, opened on December 8, 1941—the day after Pearl Harbor.³⁰ Immigrants who had escaped to the United States or other countries of refuge were haunted by the family members they had left behind or were unable to assist, as the letters from Europe stopped coming. But even after the end of World War II, when images and reports of the Allied liberation of concentration camps appeared in national newspapers and magazines, the revealed horror of the Holocaust did not result in substantive changes to the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act. The United States had a racist quota system until 1965. Although the Holocaust did begin a long reckoning related to refugees and displaced persons, laws to assist them over the next thirty-five years still numerically limited entry for specific populations, with these decisions tied up in the ongoing Cold War.

Handwringing over America’s failure to open immigration to Jewish refugees in the 1930s has not resulted in a unified, bipartisan, long-term United States government commitment to aid refugees. The 1980 Refugee Resettlement Act, still in force in 2021, ultimately places the number of refugees admitted to the United States each year in the hands of the president and subject to his political whims. For those fleeing racially or religiously motivated violence—or even ongoing genocide—today the United States can look much as it did in the 1930s: with the door cracked enough to garner hope, slammed often enough to engender despair. Refugee artists in the 1930s and 1940s—from Anni Albers to Hedda Sterne to Marc Chagall, Arthur Szyk, and Max Ernst—reflected this hope and despair, the trauma of migration and genocide, in their works. Can we use the messages in their work to better aid refugees today?

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1. David Reed, "America of the Melting Pot Comes to An End," *The New York Times*, 1924 April 27, xx3.
 2. Douglas C. Baynton, "Defectives in the Land: Disability and American Immigration Policy, 1882–1924," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 24, no. 3 (Spring, 2005): 31–44.
 3. In theory, this meant that quotas were set at 2% of the number of Americans who recorded (for example) British or German backgrounds on the 1890 census.
 4. The Johnson-Reed Act included a plan to recalculate the quotas in 1927, but the reassessment was delayed until 1929. For clarity, I am using the post-1929 numbers as these were the numbers in effect during the 1930s–1940s. For the quotas and how they changed, see "Annual Quotas and Quota Immigrants Admitted" chart in the *INS Monthly Review*, June 1945 (<https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/010395122>). Note that the statistics are for quota immigrants *admitted* to the United States, not the number of visas issued.
 5. Alien husbands with American wives were not allowed to enter as nonquota immigrants until July 1932, after a prolonged and public struggle during which Jewish groups and a "Citizen Wives" organization argued that American citizen wives were falling into poverty while their alien husbands were waiting in foreign lands, rejected as "likely to become a public charge." Nancy F. Cott, "Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States, 1830–1934," *The American Historical Review*, 103, no. 5 (December 1998): 1440–1474.
 6. "Department of State," *Code of Federal Regulations, Division of the Federal Register*, 1949 edition, Chapter 1, § 42.326 and § 42.335 (a) Samuel H. Williamson, *Measuring Worth* (website), 2021, <https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/> (retrieved June 26, 2021).
 7. A quota year ran from July 1–June 30. A. Dana Hodgdon memo, October 19, 1933, US State Department, RG-59, Correspondence related to Immigration, 1910–1939, Box 38, 150.062/Public Charge/629 ½, National Archives, College Park, MD (NACP).
 8. Letter from Messersmith to Carr, July 5, 1933, p. 2, U.S. State Department, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry 702, Box 148, FW 150.626J/14, NACP.
 9. A. Dana Hodgdon, May 15, 1933, quoting an April 7, 1933, letter from Messersmith, cover letter of "Measures Considered with Respect to the Attitude of the United States toward the Jews in Germany," May 31, 1933. U.S. State Department, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Correspondence related to Immigration, Box 148, 150.626 J/5, NACP.
 10. Hodgdon. (See n.9.)
 11. This data, and the data related to the immigration of all the artists referenced in this essay, is drawn from ship manifests found on ancestry.com.
 12. "Measures Considered with Respect to the Attitude of the United States toward the Jews in Germany," May 31, 1933, U.S. State Department, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry 702, Visa Division Correspondence re: Immigration 1940–1945, Box 148, 150.626 J/5, NACP.
 13. "Removal of Capital from Germany by Emigrants," May 29, 1934, U.S. State Department, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry 702, Box 148, 150.626J/89. By 1939, \$1.00 equaled approximately 2.49 RM.
 14. "Consular Administration of the Public Charge and Other Provisions of the Immigration Laws," January 5, 1937, U.S. State Department, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Entry 702, Visa Division Correspondence re: Immigration 1940–1945, Box 148, 150.626J/242, NACP.
 15. The quota reports from which these statistics were compiled are located in RG-59, U.S. Department of State, General Visa Correspondence, 1930–1939 and 1940–1944, 811.111/Quota, NACP.
 16. Raymond Geist, "Immigration Visa Applicants of German Jewish Agricultural Students," August 11, 1939; RG-59, General Visa Correspondence, 1940–1944, Box 231, 811.11184/Hyde Farmlands, NACP. For more detail, see the essay by Patricia Lewy elsewhere on this site and her substantial volume on Dzubas: Patricia L. Lewy, *Friedel Dzubas* (Milan: Skira Editore, 2019).

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17. Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll #1938-0139: Nazi Germany/Politics, Question 12, USGALLUP.38–139.Q03 (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1938).
 18. "Consideration of Visa Cases," September 28, 1940. RG 59, Entry A1-704, General Visa Correspondence, 1940–1944, Box 151, 811.111/608, NACP.
 19. Cable from Basel consulate, February 27, 1941. RG 59, Entry A1-704, General Visa Correspondence, 1940–1944, Box 154, 811.111/1048, NACP.
 20. Hoover to Berle, August 8, 1941, RG 59, Entry A1-704, General Visa Correspondence, 1940–1944, Box 156, 811.111/1725, NACP.
 21. ~~U.S.G.P.O.~~ *Laws Applicable to Immigration and Nationality* (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office [USGPO], 1953), p. 1137.
 22. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940: Vol. II, General and Europe* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1957), 229; RG 59, 811.111 W.R./1.
 23. Letter, Sillers to Harrison, January 29, 1941, RG 59, Entry A1-704, General Visa Correspondence, 1940–1944, Box 152, 811.111 Refugees/922, NACP.
 24. At this time, ships also ran from Marseilles to Casablanca (or to Lisbon), and from there, refugees could go to the United States. August 17, 1940, U.S. State Department General Visa Correspondence, RG 59, Entry A1-704, Box 147, General Visa Correspondence, 1940–1944, 811.111/195, NACP.
 25. *The Department of State Bulletin* 4, no. 104, publication 1614 (June 21, 1941): 74B.
 26. Press Release No. 308, June 18, 1941, U.S. State Department General Visa Correspondence, RG 59, Entry A1-704, General Visa Correspondence, 1940–1944, 811.111 Refugees/1585, NACP.
 27. Memo from the Assistant Secretary to Hull, Welles, and Long, February 28, 1941, U.S. State Department General Visa Correspondence, RG 59, Entry A1-704, Central Decimal File 811.111 Refugees/1883.
 28. "Annual Quotas and Quota Immigrants Admitted" chart in the *INS Monthly Review*, June 1945, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/010395122>.
 29. Peter Hayes, ed., *How Was it Possible? A Holocaust Reader*, for the Jewish Foundation for the Righteous (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 428.
 30. The concentration camp at Auschwitz opened in 1940 but had not yet expanded into a killing center. The killing center component of the camp system, Auschwitz II-Birkenau, opened in 1942.